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DOES MEDIATION SYSTEMATICALLY
DISADVANTAGE WOMEN?
MARGARET

F.

BRINIG*

When state legislatures enabled spouses to obtain divorces
without proving fault,1 one of the real achievements was lower
transaction costs. 2 Although the benefit of lower transaction costs
for divorce is not completely noncontroversial, the relaxed proof
* Professor of Law at George Mason University School of Law. I owe thanks to the
George Mason Law School for research assistance, to the Law and Economics Workshop
at George Mason University for many helpful comments, and to many individuals who
have read this paper and offered suggestions. Among these are Michael Alexeev, Ian
Ayres, Katherine Bartlett, Jane Cohen, Steven Crafton, Christine Jolls, Bruce Kobayashi,
David Levy, Timothy Muris, Richard Posner, and Samuel Rea. Data collection would have
been impossible without the help of Mary M. Brinig.
1. The no-fault divorce movement began in 1969 and took until 1985 before it fully
matured in the United States. See, e.g., HERBERT JACOB, SILENT REVOLUTION: THE TRANSFORMATION OF DIVORCE LAW IN THE UNITED STATES (1988); Lawrence M. Friedman, Rights
of Passage:Divorce Law in HistoricalPerspective, 63 OR.L. REV. 649 (1984).
2. Martin Zelder, Inefficient Dissolutions as a Consequence of Public Goods: The Case
of No-FaultDivorce, 22 J. LEGAL STUD'. 503 (1993); Robert H. Mnookin, DivorceBargaining:
The Limits on Private Ordering, 18 U. MICH. J. L. REF. 1015 (1985); H. Elizabeth Peters,
Marriageand Divorce:Informational Constraintsand Private Contracting,76 AMER. ECON.
REV. 437 (1986).
In Wisconsin, one study showed that mediating couples spent about one-fifth as much
on legal fees as those that pursued an adversary divorce. Howard Ehrlanger et al., The
Process of Negotiation: An Exploratory Investigation in the Context of No-Fault Divorce,
40 Wis. L. REV. 1133, 1142 (1988).
3. Douglas Allen, What's At Fault with No-Fault (Working Paper presented at the
Canadian Law and Economics Association meeting, Toronto, September 25, 1992); ALLEN
M. PAReMAN, NO-FAULT DIVORCE: WHAT WENT WRONG? 63 (1992). These authors argue
that the lower transaction costs cause some inefficient divorces; couples who ought to
stay together because of the high value of marriage for one party divorce because the
other can exit the marriage without incurring high costs.
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requirements mean that lawyers do not necessarily have to be
involved in divorce proceedings. The vast majority of marriage
dissolutions involve written agreements between the parties.4
No-fault divorce also energized the divorce mediation movement.
Mediation is the least intrusive form of third-party involvement
in a dispute. Whereas a judge or arbitrator imposes an outcome
on the disputants, the mediator assists the parties in reaching a
mutually satisfactory agreement. 5 The mediator helps to "identify
the issues, reduce misunderstandings, vent emotions, clarify priorities, find points of agreement, and explore new areas of compromise and possible solutions."
Family mediation is seen as an opportunity to provide "divorcing couples with an opportunity to nurture" their necessarily
continuing relationships. 7 No longer must the divorcing couple
engage in legal combat.8 A group of nonlawyer divorce mediators
explains that mediation was "believed to be more expeditious,
less expensive, procedurally reasonable, and amenable to truth-

4. Dramatic

changes

in

divorce

law

during

the

past

decade

now permit a substantial degree of private ordering. The "no-fault revolution"
has made divorce largely a matter of private concern. Parties to a marriage
can now explicitly create circumstances that will allow divorce. Indeed,
agreement between spouses is not necessary in most states; either spouse
can unilaterally create the grounds for dissolution simply by separation for
a sufficient period of time.
Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case
of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 953-54 (1979).
5. STEPHEN B. GOLDBERG ET AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION 91 (1985); see also HOWARD
RAIFFA, THE ART AND SCIENCE OF NEGOTIATION (1982) (defining a mediator as an impartial
outsider who aids negotiators in their quest to find a compromise agreement).
6. Jessica Pearson & Nancy Thoennes, Mediating and Litigating Custody Disputes:
A Longitudinal Evaluation, 17 FAM. L.Q. 451, 497-98 (1984); see also Egrnie Odom, The
Mediation Hearing: A Primer, in JOSEPH PALENSKI & HAROLD M. LAUNER, MEDIATION,
CONTEXTS AND CHALLENGES 5-14 (1986); Carol Lefcourt, Women, Mediation and Family
Law, 18 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 266, 267 (1984).
7. In most divorcing families there are minor children. Although the parties no longer
live together, they must co-parent for some period of time, thus continuing their relationship. See, e.g., John S. Murray, Improving Parent-Child Relationships Within the
Divorced Family: A Call for Legal Reform, 19 U. MICH. J. L. REF. 563 (1986); see also
Gary J. Friedman & Margaret L. Anderson, Divorce Mediation's Strengths. .. , 3 CAL.
LAW 36 (July 1983) ("[Clouples have found that the adversarial approach distances them
from each other when they still want to have a caring, or at least respectful, foundation
for their relationship.").
8. Russell M. Coombs, Noncourt-Connected Mediationand Counseling in Child.Custody
Disputes, 17 FAMt. L.Q. 469, 470 (1984); Lawrence D. Gaughan, Taking a Fresh Look at
Divorce Mediation, 17 TRIAL 39 (April 1981); Janet Maleson Spencer & Joseph P. Zammit,
Mediation-Arbitration:A Proposalfor Private Resolution of Disputes Between Divorced or
Separated Parents, 1976 DuKE L.J. 911 (1976); Patricia Vroom et al., Winning through
Mediation: Divorce Without Losers, FUTURIST, Feb. 1982, at 28.
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finding and the open airing of differences when compared to the
adversarial system."9 Further, feminists heralded mediation because it promised to consider disputes in the language of relationships rather than individual rights. 10
At first, the organized bar considered divorce mediation inconsistent with the professional ethics that all mediating attorneys,
as well as all attorneys, are required to follow. First, they feared
that nonattorney mediators would violate "unauthorized practice
of law" rules." Second, they were concerned that attorneys would
be unable to represent both (necessarily adversary) spouses, and
would therefore be involved in conflicts of interest. 2 Because of
their extensive training in legal rules as opposed to counseling,3
lawyer-mediators would be unable to resist giving legal advice.1
Because divorce in most cases does not raise difficult legal issues,
some nonlawyers suspected that the protests of the organized
bar were little more than a smoke screen to protect entry into
what had been lawyers' sole province. 4

9. Jessica Pearson et al., The Decision to Mediate: Profiles of Individuals Who Accept
and Reject the Opportunity to Mediate Child Custody and Visitation Issues, 6 J. DIVORCE
17, 20 (1982); see also Joyce Hauser-Dann, Divorce Mediation: A Growing Field?, 43
ARBITRATION J. 15, 17 (1988) (discussing that couples divorcing through the adversary
process felt that their involvement with the legal process made their relationship with
their spouse even more difficult than before, particularly for the men participating in
her study); Barbara J. Bautz, Divorce Mediation: For Better or for Worse?, 5 MED. Q. 51,
56-59 (1988); Robert Emery & Joanne A. Jackson, Charlottesville Mediation Project:
Mediated and Litigated Child Custody Disputes, 24 MED. Q. 3,12 (1989) (finding that men
were more satisfied with mediation than their spouses).
10. See, e.g., Janet Rifkin, Mediation from a Feminist Perspective: Promise and Problems, 2 LAW AND INEQUALITY 21, 23 (1984); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Portia in a Different
Voice: Speculation on Women's Lawyering Process, 1 BERKELEY WOMEN's L.J. 39, 53 (1985).
11. See, e.g., Opinion of the Bar of the City of New York #80-23 (1980); Richard C.
Crouch, Mediation and Divorce: The Dark" Side is Still Unexplored, 4 FAm. ADV. 27, 33
(1982); Project, The Unauthorized Practice of Law and Pro Se Divorce: An Empirical
Analysis, 86 YALE L.J. 104 (1976); Andrew S. Morrison, Comment, Is Divorce Mediation
the Practice of Law? A Matter of Perspective, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 1093 (1987); Arthur R.
Miller, Note, Lay Divorce Firms and the Unauthorized Practice of Law, 6 U. MICH. J.L.
REF. 423, 443 (1973).
12. See, e.g., Linda J. Silberman, Professional Responsibility Problems of Divorce Mediation, 16 FAM. L.Q. 107 (1982); Sandra E. Purnell, Comment, The Attorney as Mediator
- Inherent Conflict of Interest?, 32 UCLA L. REV. 986, 989, 1006 (1985).
13. Prohibitions against lawyer mediation on these grounds appear in Or. St. Bar
Comm'n on Legal Ethics Formal Op. 488 (1983); Wis. St. Bar Stg. Comm. on Prof. Ethics
Formal Op. E-79-2 (1978); Wis. Bar Bull. (Jan. 1980) 61; N.H. Bar Ass'n Comm. on Prof.
Ethics Op. 10. 10 N.H.L.W. 311 (1983); Ohio St. Bar Ass'n Legal Ethics and Professional
Conduct Comm'n Formal Op. 30, 48 OHIO B. 780, 783 (1975).
14. Some lawyers were quite overt about their fears:
[Mediation] would be an outrage as far as I'm concerned. It would ruin our
practice. Arbitration and mediation are a blot on the escutcheon. They'll put
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There was also concern that no-fault divorce merely shifted
conflict to areas other than the divorce itself. As one author
wrote recently:
disputes over property and custody are often battlegrounds on
which spouses indirectly work through their feelings about the
end of marriage. We must ask whether the provision of an
explicit mechanism for dealing with marital misconduct in
certain instances might better channel and control these impulses. 15

Despite their initial objections, attorneys seem to have adjusted
to mediation. 6 Interestingly, as the attorneys are disarming,
feminists in both the United States and Canada are attacking
the process. Feminists have raised a number of objections to the
use of mediation instead of the adversarial process. Some writers
argue that because women, more than men, seek connection
through relationships, 17 women might systematically fare worse.18
Others argue that women might trade custody for money to avoid
litigation because, where custody is concerned, women are more
risk averse than their husbands. 19 There is also a more general-

us all out of business. As far as I am concerned they ought to destroy all
arbitrators and mediators tomorrow.
Kressel & Hochberg, Divorce Attorneys: Assessment of a Topology and Attitudes Towards
Legal Reform, 10 J. DIVORCE 1, 10 (1987); see also Stephen J. Bahr et al., An Evaluation
of a Trial Mediation Program, 18 MED. Q. 37 (1987); Silberman, supra note 12, at 124
(Lawyers maintain a monopoly on certain tasks by supporting the prohibition of unauthorized practice of law by non-lawyer mediators).
15. MILTON C. REGAN, JR., FAMILY LAW AND THE PURSUIT OF INTIMACY 139 (1993).
16. This may be because so many attorneys now mediate, see Gaughan, supra note 8;
Silberman, supra note 12; Crouch, supra note 11, at 220, or because court congestion has
become such an overwhelming problem. See Leonard L. Loeb, Introductionto the Standards
of Practicefor Family Mediators, 17 FAM. L.Q. 451 (1984). Many state legislatures are
now providing at least an explicit mediation alternative. See, e.g., CAL. CIv. CODE S4607;
COLO. REV. STAT. SS 13-22-301; VA. CODE ANN. S 8.01-581.22 (Michie Supp. 1993); Wis.
STAT. 5 767.11(3).
17. Trina Grillo, The MediationAlternative: ProcessDangersfor Women, 100 YALE L.J.
1545 (1991); see also Beverly Horsburg, Redefining the Family: Recognizing the Altruistic
Caretaker and the Importance of Relational Needs, 25 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 423 (1992)
(discussing the problems of reckoning with altruistic caretaking in the male-dominated
system). But see Joshua D. Rosenberg, In Defense of Mediation, 33 ARIZ. L. REV. 467 (1991)
(challenging Grillo's analysis).
18. Grill, supra note 17, at 1581 (asserting that women are especially in danger
where mediation is mandatory).
19. See, e.g., Jane W. Ellis, Surveying the Terrain:A Review Essay of Divorce Reform
at the Crossroads, 44 STAN. L. REV. 471, 475 (1992); Robert F. Cochran, Jr., The Search
for Guidance in Determining the Best Interests of the Child at Divorce: Reconciling the
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ized fear that husbands will take advantage of their wives' lack
of power within the marital relationship. 20

Primary Caretaker and Joint Custody Preferences, 20 U.

RICH. L. REV.1 (1985); Mnookin
& Kornhauser, supra note 4, at 975; Richard Neely, Barter in the Court: The Hidden Cost
of Divorce, NEw REPUBLIC, Feb. 10, 1986, at 13. The problem is compounded by the fact
that many states adopted favorable treatment of joint custody at the same time as they
embraced no-fault divorce. For criticisms of this change in substantive custody standards,
see, e.g., Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Hatching the Egg: A Child-CenteredPerspective on
Parents' Rights, 14 CARDozo L. REV. 1747 (1993); Elizabeth S. Scott, Pluralism,Parental
Preference, and Child Custody, 80 CAL. L. REV. 615 (1992); Grillo, supra note 17; Katherine
Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthood as an Exclusive Status: The Need for Legal Alternatives
when the Premise of the Nuclear Family has Failed, 70 VA. L. REV. 879 (1984).
As this view has become accepted, it has altered the way we articulate and
conceive of custody issues. The dominant rhetoric no longer describes divorce
as a process that terminates the relationship between spouses, establishing
one as the custodial parent with clear responsibilities. Rather, divorce is
now described as a process that, through mediation, restructures and refomulates the spouses' relationship, conferring equal or shared parental rights
on both parents although one, in practice, usually assumes the primary
responsibility for care of the children. This is an important substantive shift.
Martha Fineman, Dominant Discourse,ProfessionalLanguage, and Legal Change in Child
Custody Decisionmakig, 101 HARv. L. REV. 727, 732 (1988). One study was unable to
detect negative financial consequences for women due to the use of mediation. Jessica
Pearson & Nancy Thoennes, Divorce Mediation: An Overview of Research Results, 19
CoLUm. J.L. & Soc. PRos. 451 (1985); see also Jessica Pearson, Ten Myths About Family
Law, 27 FAM. L.Q. 283-84 (1993) (arguing that it is mythical to think that alternative
dispute resolution procedures have eroded the financial status of women); Rosenberg,
supra note 17, at 468 ('lAIn overwhelming number of the women and men who have been
through mandatory mediation approve of it strongly."); Margaret F. Brinig & Michael V.
Alexeev, Trading at Divorce: Preferences, Legal Rules and Transaction Costs, 8 OHIO ST.
J. ON Disp. RESOL. 279, 292 (1993) (concluding that over the relevant range, trading
between money and custody does not seem to be taking place).
20. See, e.g., Joseph P. Folger & Sydney E. Bernard, Divorce Mediation: When Mediators Challengethe DivorcingParties,10 MEDIATION Q. 5, 20 (1985); Laurie Woods, Mediation:
A Backlash to Women's Progress on Family Law Issues, 19 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 431, 435
(1985).
The fundamental premise that must be understood in order to analyze the
impact of the use of mediation in family law is that women are less powerful
than men in this society. Generally women are economically dependent on
the men in their families, both during childbearing years and when they are
in the work force earning only three-fifths of what their male counterparts
can.
Lefcourt, supranote 6, at 267. These fears are characterized as misleading by Rosenberg,
supra note 17, at 249. Rosenberg argues that mediation should not be held accountable
for numerous "problems" it did not cause, such as the elimination of fault-based divorce
and changes in child custody determinations. Rosenberg asserts that whatever problems
may exist within the substantive law of child custody, they are separate from a determination of the best process to use for child custody determinations. Id at 471; see also
Penelope E. Bryan, Killing Us Softly: Divorce Mediation and the Politics of Power, 40
BUFF. L. REV. 441 (1992). Imbalance is especially problematic where there has been abuse
in the family. Lisa G. Lerman, Mediation of Wife Abuse Cases: The Adverse Impact of
Informal Dispute Resolution on Women, 7 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 57 (1984). But see Joan B.
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This paper examines if there is anything inherent in a woman's
character that disables her from bargaining effectively in mediation.21 In other words, the question is whether a woman operates
like a man when making choices. 22 Specifically, I test two prominent challenges to women's ability to mediate on par with their
husbands: their propensities toward risk aversion and altruism
(or communitarianism).23 These concepts resemble what Robert
Mnookin refers to as unequal bargaining power. 4
In Part I, I discuss how risk preferences might affect bargaining at divorce. I present empirical data that is consistent with
theories of innate gender difference. In each case, however, there
exists at least one other explanation for the results that cannot
be ruled out. In Part II, I discuss the question of whether women
are more altruistic than men. Several empirical evaluations of
altruism reveal no measurable difference based upon gender.
Overall, I conclude that a divorce mediator must be conscious
of power imbalances brought about by the difference in men's
and women's earning power and by physical abuse if present in
the relationship. Given this awareness, mediation remains a fair,
as well as an inexpensive and time-saving, process for marriage
dissolution. There is nothing inherent in being a woman that
precludes a successful mediation of marital problems.
I.

RISK AND GENDER

A. Risk Preferences
Analytically, to be risk averse is to be willing to exchange
something of value for reduced risk.2 Risk aversion may take
Kelly, Mediated and Adversarial Divorce: Respondents' Perceptions of Their Processes and
Outcomes, 24 MED. Q. 71, 78 (Table I) (1989) (divorcing wives using mediation are even
more satisfied with their ability to stand up for themselves than are their husbands or
divorcing women who used the traditional adversary process).
21. See, e.g.. Margaret Brinig & Steven Crafton, Marriage and Opportunism, 23 J.
LEGAL STUD. 869 (1994) (arguing that there may be problems stemming from the inherent
power imbalance caused by women's smaller earnings in the labor market or from abuse
in the relationship. This. lack of economic power is one of the things that gives the
husband the ability to behave opportunistically during the ongoing marriage).
22. Robert H. Frank, If Homo Economicus Could Choose His Own Utility Function,
Would He Want One with a Conscience?, 77 Ai. ECON. REV. 594 (1988).
23. Isobel Ricci, Mediator's Notebook, Reflections on Promoting Equal Empowerment
and Entitlement for Women, in DIvoRcE MEDIATION: PERSPECTIVES ON THE FIELD 49 (C.A.
Everett ed., 1985) (arguing that women exhibit a "socialized aversion to taking risks"
and that wives may play a role of a self-sacrificing "peacemaker/guardian" who focuses
on the needs of others rather than their own).
24. Mnookin, supra note 2, at 371.
25. Milton Friedman and L.J. Savage, The Utility Analysis of Choices Involving Risk,
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the form of paying a premium to avoid even
a very small chance
2
of suffering a catastrophic loss (insurance).
If women are more risk averse than men, it may explain a
number of phenomena. For this paper it is important to consider
whether women are more risk averse than men because if women
are more risk averse, they should prefer to settle cases rather
than litigate given the same probability of a favorable outcome.
There are other possible consequences of differential risk aversion. It would explain why, at least historically, women have
preferred to marry rather than to remain single.2 In this respect,
marriage resembles insurance: it exchanges the certainty of a
mate, even with limitations, for the risk that no male as good as
the present suitor might come along.2 Additionally, it may be
risk aversion rather than sex discrimination that explains significant differences in lifetime earnings, for women may be less
willing to accept employment that offers greater income variance2
or to undertake risky investment opportunities.

56 J. POL. ECON. 279, 286 (1948); see also Ejan Mackaay, ECONOMICS OF INFORMATION AND
LAW 173-74 (1982).

see

26. Friedman & Savage, supra note 25, at 285-86. For a less rigorous modern account,
ROBERT JERRY, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW 11-15 (1987).
27. See, e.g., MICHAEL GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEARTH: LAW AND THE FAMILY IN

NINETEENTH CENTURY AMERICA (1985); MARY ANN GLENDON, THE NEW FAMILY AND THE
NEW PROPERTY 31-32 (1981);.GERMAINE GREER, THE FEMALE EUNUCH 23842 (1971) (women

marrying for security); Margaret Brinig, Rings and Promises,6 J. L., ECON. & ORG. (1990).
28. Women may prefer marrying early because they are more risk averse. See supra
note 19. Because women are unwilling to wait, they might accept a less desirable mate
than they would if risk neutral. Since men are by hypothesis more risk neutral, a man
who is less desirable than average might be able to marry a woman who is more desirable.
Of course, as with all search models, variation occurs within the pools (here of men and
women). For more lengthy descriptions of courtship as search behavior, see, e.g., Gary
Becker, A Theory of Marriage, in ECONOMICS OF THE FAMILY: MARRIAGE, CHILDREN, AND

A CONFERENCE REPORT OF THE NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
(Theodore W. Schultz, ed., 1974). or the less formal PAULA ENGLAND & GEORGE FARKAS,
HUMAN CAPITAL:

HOUSEHOLDS, EMPLOYMENT AND GENDER (1986). Marriage also functions as insurance

because if one spouse cannot work, the other may provide for both. If one becomes ill
or infirm, the other is there to help. K.N. Llewellyn, Behind the Law of Divorce (pt. 1),
32 COLUM. L. REV. 1281, 1290 (1932); Bea Ann Smith, The PartnershipTheory of Marriage:
A Borrowed Solution Fails, 68 TEx. L. REv. 689, 694 (1990).
The housewife is an unpaid worker in her husband's house in return for the
security of being a permanent employee: hers is the reductio ad absurdum
of the case of the employee who accepts a lower wage in return for
permanence in his employment.
Modern women, who are working outside the home in a majority of cases,
may not need the "insurance" of marriage, and therefore may be more
inclined either not to marry in the first place or to divorce.
GERMANE GREER, supra note 27, at 239; see, e.g., ALLEN PARKMAN, supra note 3; Douglas
Allen, supra note 3.
29. See, e.g., Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Sears, 628 F. Supp. 1264
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If risk preferences differ by gender, it is easy to demonstrate
profound implications for a society in which individual choice
plays a central role.3 1 Ordinarily, contracts equate differences in
individual risk preference at the margin. Each party negotiates
until they bear ex ante the desired level of risk. For instance,
the party that is risk neutral will bear both the potential gains
and losses by shouldering the exposure to the risk.3' However,
as some have argued, relative risk preference may not be conscious; it may stem from biological or environmental factors.3 2

(N.D. Ill. 1986) (concluding that the EEOC had not proven discrimination because women
apparently preferred the lower paid salaried jobs to the higher paid commissioned jobs),
affd, 839 F.2d 302 (7th Cir. 1988). But see Joan Scott, Deconstructing Equality-VersusDifference: Post StructuralistTheory for Feminism, 14 FEMINIST STUD. 33 (1988) (debunking
the idea that women are not equally attracted to more risk-endowed professions than
men); Joan C. Williams, Dissolving the Sameness/Difference Debate: A Post-Modern Path
Beyond Essentialism in Feminist and Critical Race Theory, 1991 DUKE L.J. 296 (1991);
Vicki Schultz, Telling Stories about Women and Work: Judicial Interpretations of Sex
Segregation in the Workplace in Title VII Cases Raising the Lack of Interest Argument,
103 HARV. L. REV. 1749, 1808-09 (1990). Possible occupations are ranked in order of
riskiness by Friedman and Savage, supra note 25, at 284. They consider occupations
involving little or no risk about money return to include school teaching, other civil
service employment, and clerical work. Those involving a moderate degree of risk, but
unlikely to lead to either extreme gains or extreme losses, are occupations like "dentistry,
accountancy, and some kinds of managerial work." Those involving much risk, with some
possibility of extremely large gains and some of extremely large losses, include occupations involving physical risks like piloting aircraft and automobile racing, and "professions
like medicine and law, and business undertakings in untried fields." Id.
30. Of course, risk preference does not explain all sociological differences between
men and women. Male aggression does not necessarily transfer into risk-loving behavior,
although it might on occasion. It also presumably has little to do with conversational
styles, such as those discussed in Deborah Tannen's provocative book, You JUST DON'T
UNDERSTAND ME (1990).

31. See, e.g., ROBERT SCOTT & DOUGLAS LESLIE, CONTRACT LAW AND THEORY 9 (1988);
Ian R. Macneil, The Many Futures of Contract, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 691 (1974).
32. Richard. Epstein, The Varieties of Self-Interest, 8 Soc. PHIL. & POL'Y 102 (1990)
(limiting women's access to dangerous occupations in order to assure continuation of the
human species may be rational).
[The marginal rates of substitution differ systematically for males and
females. So long as reproduction is the central objective in evolution, we
should expect that any trait that is relevant to reproduction will be central
to all aspects of the behavior of both sexes. The implication of asymmetrical
sex roles is that males should be less risk-averse (or more risk-preferring)
than females when each act out of their own self-interest.
Id. at 108. But see International Union v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187 (1990)
(holding that a battery manufacturing company could not prohibit fertile women from
engaging in tasks where a potential fetus might be exposed to dangerous levels of lead).
The company had changed its policy from its original one of simply warning female
employees of the potential dangers and allowing them to assume the risk to one of
protecting the unborn. As Judge Easterbrook said in rejecting the company's choice in
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Thus behavioral differences may not be amenable to political
tinkering. To the contrary, relative risk preference may engender
"unintended consequences," resulting in the worsening of conditions for women and children. For example, if women are genetically predisposed to risk aversion and society chooses to
eliminate alimony to equalize men's and women's incomes, women
will not "adapt" to the changed divorce regime by working at
higher wages in the labor market, because this would require
them to accept uncomfortable levels of risk. After divorce, women
would still be disadvantaged relative to their former husbands.
More than a decade has passed since the appearance of Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce.4 The
authors noted that since the emergence of no-fault divorce, bargaining between divorcing spouses occurred in the overwhelming
majority of cases. They suggested that this negotiation took place
within the framework of the couple's expectations about judicial
resolution of their dispute. 35 In other words, neither party would
be expected to settle for less than the predicted court outcome.
However, they cautioned that if the spouses did not have the
same attitudes about risk, the reformed gender-neutral divorce
laws might systematically favor one spouse over the other. In
particular, if women were more risk averse than their husbands,
they might give up some share of the family wealth they otherthe Court of Appeals:
RIisk to the next generation is incident to all activity, starting with getting
out of bed. (Staying in bed all day has its own hazards). To insist on zero
risk, which the court says [the employer] may do, is to exclude women from
the industrial jobs that have been a male preserve. By all means let society
bend its energies to improving the prospects of those who come after us.
Demanding zero risk produces not progress but paralysis. Defining tolerable
risk, and seeking to reduce that limit, is more useful-but it is a job for.
Congress or OSHA in conjunction with medical and other sciences. Laudable
though its objective be, [the employer] may not reach its goal at the expense
of women.
International Union v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 886 F.2d 871, 920-21 (7th Cir. 1989) (Easterbrook, J., dissenting). A slightly less controversial biosocial position is presented in
Alice Rossi, A Biosooial Perspective on Parenting, 106 DAEDALUS 1 (Spring 1977); and
Equality between the Sexes: An Immodest Proposal,93 DAEDALUS 607 (1984). But see NANCY
CHODORow, THE REPRODUCTION OF MOTHERING 7 (1978) (any difference between males and

females is learned rather than biologically based).
33. See Brinig & Crafton, supra note 21 (consequences of no-fault divorce).
34. Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 4.
35. In economic terms, the expected court outcome was analogous to the "endowment
point" of an Edgeworth-Bowley box with axes of custodial time and share of marital
wealth, and with the spouse's beginning points for bargaining being their indifference
curves that ran through this point. Bargaining takes place within the "lens" shaped by
the two indifference curves.
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court in order to avoid the uncertainty that
wise would obtain in
36
litigation presents.
Studies have shown that in most cases, women continue to be
the primary caretakers of children following divorce.3 7 Further,
many of these new single-head-of-household families have a reduced standard of living following dissolution of the marriage,3
despite the broadening concept of "marital" (as opposed to "separate") property. 39
There has been little empirical testing of Mnookin and Kornhauser's "trading" theory 0 that couples trade custody for assets,
and therefore most evidence is anecdotal. 41 Even if couples do

36. This possibility is acknowledged by Rosenberg, supra note 17, at 501 n.130. Recent
family law literature suggests that this type of "trading" does occur. Robert Cochran
used it as part of his argument against a gender-neutral "best interests" test for child
custody, suggesting that a preference for the primary caretaker would eliminate some of
the problem. Cochran, supra note 19, at 30-34. Likewise, Justice Richard Neely of the
West Virginia Supreme Court wrote that as a trial lawyer for divorcing men, he would
take advantage of his adversary's risk aversion by threatening litigation, even when his
client did not really want significant custodial responsibilities. Richard Neely, The Primary
CaretakerParent Rule: Child Custody and the Dynamics of Greed, 3 YALE L. & PoL'Y REV.
168, 171-72, 178-79 (1984); see also Elizabeth Scott, supra note 19, at 626-27 (1992).
37. See, e.g., Robert Mnookin et al., Private Ordering Revisited: What Custodial Arrangements Are Parents Negotiating?, in DIVORCE REFORM AT THE CROSSROADS 37, 53
(Stephen Sugarman & Herma Hill Kay eds. 1990).
38. See, e.g., LENORE J. WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION 337-43 (1985); Marsha
Garrison, The Economics of Divorce: ChangingRules, Changing Results, in DIVORCE REFORM
AT THE CROSSROADS, supra note 37 at 75; Greg Duncan & Saul Hoffman, A Reconsideration
of the Economic Consequences of Divorce, 22 DEMOGRAPHY 485, 495 (1985); Robert Weiss,
The Impact of MaritalDissolutionon Income and Consumption in Single-ParentHouseholds,
46 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 115 (1984); Robert Hampton, Marital Disruption: Some Social
and Economic Consequences, in FIVE THOUSAND AMERICAN FAMILIES: PATTERNS OF ECONOMIC
PROGRESS 163, 171-74 (1975); GLORIA STERIN & JOSEPH DAVIS, DIVORCE AwARDS AND
OUTCOMES: A STUDY OF PATTERN AND CHANGE IN CUYAHOGA COUNTY,

OHIO, 1965-1978

(1981); Robert McGraw et al., A Case Study in Divorce Law Reform and Its Aftermath, 20
J. FAM. L. 443 (1981-82); James McLindon, Separate but Unequal: The Economic Disaster
of Divorce for Women and Children, 21 FAM. L.Q. 351 (1987); Karen Seal, A Decade of NoFaultDivorce: What It Has Meant Financiallyfor Women in California, FAM. ADV. 1, 10
(1979).
39. The data is suggestive, but not conclusive, that women are worse off following
no-fault divorce than they were under the old fault system. See, e.g., Stephen Sugarman,
Dividing Financial Interests on Divorce, in DIVORCE REFORM AT THE CROSSROADS, supra
note 37 at 130; Marygold Melli, Constructing a Social Problein: The Post-Divorce Plight of
Women and Children, 1986 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 759, 769-70 (1986); see also Lenore J.
Weitzman, The Economics of Divorce: Social and Economic Consequences of Property,
Alimony and Child Support Awards, 28 UCLA L. REV. 1181 (1981) (discussing whether
their former husbands in fact enjoy enhanced lifestyles); Lenore J. Weitzman, THE DIVORCE
REVOLUTION, supra note 38. The data suggesting the poverty many women with children
experience following divorce has not been satisfactorily explained.
40. Mnookin et al., supra note 37; Brinig & Alexeev, supra note 19.
41. See, e.g., Neely, supra note 36.
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trade custody for assets, this trading may not necessarily be bad.
Economists generally suggest that, all other things being equal,
such trading allocates resources, human and financial, to their
most highly valued uses. 4 2 However, if the couple does not share
risk preferences, a no-fault system may lead to increased postcontractual opportunism affecting bargaining outcomes. 3
For many years, modern economics has accepted the proposition that people behave in characteristic ways in the face of
risk.44 The fear of catastrophic losses (hence the purchase of
insurance) and the desire to minimize variance in income (hence
diversification of investment) are two approaches to dealing with
risk. Because people value the first dollar they possess more
than the millionth, they fear catastrophic loss even though the
likelihood of its occurrence in any individual case is remote.
Therefore, many individuals purchase insurance. 45 As insurance
salespeople suggest, they "purchase peace of mind." Further,
many individuals, afraid of variance in their fortunes, will "hedge"

42. Allan Farnsworth, Legal Remedies for Breach of Contract,70 COLUM. L. REV. 1145,
1145-47 (1970); R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. LAW & ECON. 1 (1960). Women,
at least to some extent, actually value time with their children more highly than do their
husbands. Margaret F. Brinig & Michael V. Alexeev, Legal Rules, Bargaining, and
Transaction Costs: The Case of Divorce, in SYSTEMATIC DISPUTE RESOLUTION 91 (Stuart
Nagel & Miriam Mills eds. 1991). If this is true, and if divorcing fathers still view their
children's welfare as important, children ought to end up with enough money through
child support to live comfortably. Unfortunately, many noncustodial fathers do not make
child support payments faithfully. DAVID CHAMBERS, MAKING FATHERS PAY (1983); Yoram
Weiss & Robert Willis, Children as Collective Goods in Divorce Settlements, 3 J. LAB.
ECON. 268 (1985). Federal mechanisms to insure more efficient collection have been
instituted during the past several years. Child Support Enforcement and Enforcement of
Paternity Amendments to Title IV of the Social. Security Act. 42 U.S.C. 5S 65140.
Assuming they negotiate, the spouses are dealing ex ante knowing that child support
cannot be easily enforced. The wife's risk aversion reduces the cost of the husband's
acting in bad faith.
43. Brinig & Crafton, supra note 21. One problem, of course, is that divorce bargaining
in most families involves third parties, the children of the marriage. Even though divisions
may be "fair" from the perspective of the divorcing spouses, the state is unwilling to
mortgage the children's future, either by "awarding" custody to the less successful parent,
or by providing the custodial parent with fewer financial resources than are required to
do a successful job of parenting. This sort of "unfairness" is not the inequality of
bargaining power that used to result in the invalidation of separation agreements. At
that time, it was the women's alleged inexperience in financial and legal affairs that
resulted in violation of a confidential relationship or unconscionability.
44. See, e.g., JOHN VON NEUMANN & OSKAR MORGENSTERN, THEORY OF GAMES AND
ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR (1944); FRANK H. KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY AND PROFIT 198-99

(1920).

45. Friedman & Savage, supra note 25, at 285H6. The difference between expected
utility and the utility of expected income explains this behavior.
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by in-vesting in a portfolio of assets. 6 Holding a diversified
portfolio allows a person to adjust the amount of risk she bears
to a level consistent with her risk preferences. Thus, while
holding a portfolio will virtually eliminate the possibility of reaping pure profits, it will also minimize the threat of losing eve47
rything because of a single unwise investment.
Risk aversion has been characterized as a middle class phenomenon, 48 risk neutrality as belonging to large institutions, such
as banks, corporations, and insurers, who can spread risk effectively, and risk preference as belonging to the very poor (who
have literally nothing to lose) and the very rich (who by their
acceptance of the risk of entrepreneurship may reap great rewards). 49 Contrary to popular belief, there is nothing "wrong" or
unhealthy about either risk preference or risk aversion. 56
If we assume that women are generally more risk averse than
men, the difference in attitudes about risk would cut across all
classes and groups, affecting significant decisions of each person
every day. For example, women may pay more for new cars than
their male counterparts not because they know less, but because
their greater aversion to risk causes them to fear losing the
deal.5'
In another example, girls might not perform as well on standardized tests as comparably intelligent boys because of their
risk aversion. If wrong answers are deducted from the total
score, a risk averse girl may leave a question blank, even though
she has been able to eliminate two out of the four possible

46. See, e.g., Harry Markowitz, Portfolio Selection, 7 J. FIN. 77 (1952).
47. Id.

48. Cf. Friedman & Savage, supra note 25, at 286.
49. See, e.g., Joseph E. Stiglitz & Andrew Weiss, Credit Rationing in Markets with
Imperfect Information, 71 AM. ECON. REV. 393, 404 (1981) (Theorem 10).
50. To a certain extent risk preference may be necessary for biological reasons.
Sociobiologists suggest that this behavior, at least for nonhuman animals, may serve both
to attract mates and to weed out the less physically able. See, e.g., EDWARD WILSON,
SOCIOBIOLOGY 158-62 (1980); EDWARD WILSON, ON HUMAN NATURE 86-87 (1978); Jack Hir-

schleifer, Evolutionary Models in Economics and Law: Cooperation Verses Conflict Strategies, 4 REs. IN LAW & ECON. 1, 39-40 (1982). Studies have shown that adolescents, as a
group, tend to be less risk averse than younger or older people of similar backgrounds.
Charles Lewis & Mary Ann Lewis, PeerPressure and Risk-Taking Behaviors in Children,
74 Am. J. PUB. HEALTH 580 (1984).

51. But see Ian Ayres, Fair Driving: Gender and Race Discriminationin Retail Car
Negotiations, 104 HARV. L. REv. 817 (1991) (suggesting evidence for demand-side discrimination, but also suggesting that women and blacks may have greater search costs or
less information about the market).
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choices. 2 A risk neutral boy would choose between the two
answers he considers the most plausible, and therefore may earn
a higher score. Although boys perform better on standardized
tests, a recent study of the American Association of University
Women argues that girls do just as well in school. 3 If our

assumption is correct, then the results are not entirely a consequence of bias in question content (for example, "sports" questions), but are the result of risk aversion operating through the
scoring system.
B. Empirical Testing of Risk Aversion
To test whether women are more risk averse than men, it is
necessary to examine several phenomena. One phenomenon concerns behavior in the face of only "positive" or "neutral" states
of the world. This involves the question of winning or not winning,
without the chance of loss (other than the opportunity cost of
time). Another concerns behavior in the face of "negative" states
of the world, which means that there is a chance that by engaging
in an activity a bad consequence will result. The purchase of
insurance manifests this sort of risk aversion. A third concerns
more traditional gambling behavior, in which a small sum is paid
for a chance of winning a larger prize.
To study the phenomenon resulting from a "positive" state of
the world, a simple experiment was conducted. In a random
sample, more than three hundred people of different ages were
confronted with a game consisting of three jars from which they
could try to draw a winning ball.55 Each subject was told that

52. This is the same conclusion reached in Afalcolm Slakter et al., Sex, Grade Level
and Risk Taking on Objective Exams, 39 J. EXPER. EDUc. 65 (1971) (nonsense questions
not attempted by girls and older children).
53. AM. Assoc. OF UNiv. WOMEN, HOW SCHOOLS SHORTCHANGE GmLs (1992).

54. Although I have been unable to study this type of risk taking behavior in a
systematic way, evidence from the only state lotteries collecting this kind of demographic
data suggests that the largest proportion of their clientele is male. IDAHO LOTTERY:
ANNUAL REPORT 1990-91 at 23 (showing that 48% of the players are female and 52% of
the players are male). The state population is 50% female. Whether this is statistically
significant can not be calculated from the information provided. Similar results were
reported for the District of Columbia Lottery by Dr. Clem Eyo, January, 1992.
55. Participants ranged in age from four to 62 years old and included all students in
an elementary school, several entire classes at a high school, and volunteers from a center
for legal and graduate education. All institutions were located in the greater Washington,
D.C. area. Obviously the younger participants were not of an age to be married, let alone
divorced. However, the results demonstrate that the dramatic change in risk-taking
behavior occurs at adolescence. After this time, when people might be involved in
mediation, women are consistently more risk averse than are men.
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the red jar contained a 900/ chance of winning, but the reward
was very small. The yellow jar contained a 200/0 chance of
winning, with a slightly larger reward. The blue jar contained
only a 5/o chance of winning, while the reward was very large.
Information was collected about each participant's age, sex, and
zip code, w as well as the jar chosen. Descriptive statistics follow:
Table L

Statistics on Positive Risk Taking Experiment

Variable

N

Mean

Std. Dev.

AGE

362

18.243

SEX

362

.44013

INCOME

362

249,490

71403

7

Variance

Minimum

Maximum

12.243

149.89

4.00

62.00

0.49721

0.24722

0.0000

1.0000

50984

85000

1570000

The data was analyzed using the multinomial logit technique.
The results follow, with significant coefficients5 presented in
bold face:

56. The zip code was used as a proxy for wealth; however, it is possible that the zip
code/wealth measure may have picked up people with non-liquid assets in housing rather
than larger income streams.
57. The value for male being 1 and the value for female being 0.
58. Significant to .05. I chose this analytical tool because the dependent variable
(choice) was discrete, meaning that it was neither continuous nor binary. Discussions of
multinomial logit appear in PETER KENNEDY, A GUIDE TO ECONOMETRICS 230-31 (1992), and
for a more sophisticated discussion see G. S. MADDALA, LIMITED-DEPENDENT AND QUALITATIVE VARIABLES IN ECONOMETRICS 41 (1983).
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Table II. Positive Risk Taking by Age and Sex
Parameter

Estimate

Standard Error

T-Statistic

Yellow

-1.29601

.786015

-1.64883

SEX (Yellow)

-.656640

.908528

-.722752

AGE (Yellow)

.077420

.064000

1.20969

AGE2 (Yellow)

-.134425E-02

.137105E-02

-.980453

SEX*AGE (Yellow)

.073211

.093599

.782184

SEX*AGE 2 (Yellow)

-.160732E-02

.195714E-02

-.821260

INCOME (Yellow)

-.591005E-06

.161654E-05

.365599

Blue

.128783

.863243

.149185

SEX (Blue)

-1.18746

.893929

-1.32836

AGE (Blue)

-.054249

.066402

-.816976

AGE 2 (Blue)

.148389E-02

.135548E-02

1.09473

SEX*AGE (Blue)

.187445

.090133

2.07964

SEX*AGE

-.389310E-02

.179653E-02

-2.16701

-.232022E-05

.199198E-05

-1.16478

(Blue)

INCOME (Blue)
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The function dP/dX for the various values was derived as follows:5 9

Table IIl. Partial Derivatives of Positive Risk
Taking by Age and Sex
RED

YELLOW

BLUE

CONSTANT

.15739

-0.27667

0.11928

SEX

2.21510

-0.047537

-0.16756

AGE

-0.00043712

0.019970

-0.015599

AGE2

0.000017337

-0.00038682

0.00036948

SEXAGE

-0.029931

0.0012291

0.028702

INCOME

0.00063312

-0.000043413

-0.00058970

SEXAGE 2

1.72593D-07

2.93402d-07

-4.65997D-07

Plotting the average values of the derivative from the choice
of the most risky jar, Blue, with respect to sex, revealed the
60
curve displayed below.
Figure 1. Plot of Differential Risk Taking.

Probability of Choosing Blue
By Age and Sex

0.2

0-A.................................................................

...

o-0.6

-0.8

1

11

21

31
Age

41

51

51

This study shows that, although gender alone is not significant
in itself for predicting which jar people will choose, when
59. See MADDALA, supra note 58, at 23. Maddala thoroughly explains how the probability is derived. Id at 35. The choice of red was normalized to zero.
60. The equation for the expression dP/dSEX= -.16756 + .0287 AGE -.0005897 AGE2.
The graph is for the plot of the derivative at the values of the independent variables,
including the coefficient on sex, which is not significant.
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combined with age it becomes a significant predictor of risktaking behavior.61 As Figure 1 demonstrates, men will choose the
highest risk situation beginning in adolescence. After about age
forty, the parties' risk preferences again cross, with women
preferring risk more than men do. Above the line at zero, men
prefer risk more than women do. Below the line, it is women
who choose the riskier gamble. The "zero" point is reached at
about age 11, the onset of adolescence. The difference in risk
taking propensities reaches its height at about age 30. The
tendencies for men and women are the same again at about age
45. The vast majority of couples divorce between ages 25 and
4562 Translated into the family law context, the behavior in this
study demonstrates that during the period of likely mediation,
men will prefer risk more than their wives will.
The study above involved "positive" risk taking, meaning that
there was no chance of loss. However, very few "games" involve
no possible loss, and clearly mediation involves losses as well as
gains. Therefore, it is important to study the effect of possible
loss on risk taking. Another analysis examined speeding convictions for a single month in Fairfax County, Virginia. 63 Information65
was collected on the code violation," age, sex, and zip code.
Over four thousand convictions were analyzed, using fine=O for
tickets for 0-10 miles over the speed limit, fine = 1 for tickets for
traveling 10-15 miles over the speed limit, fine =2 for tickets for
traveling 15-20 miles over the speed limit, and so forth up to
fine=7 for traveling 45 or more miles over the speed limit. The
outcomes of a multinomial logit analysis follow as Table IV,66
with significant coefficients presented in bold face:

61. The curve of the graph is consistent with the sociobiologists' hypothesis that men
are relatively more risk loving during the period in which they are trying to attract
mates, while women tend to be more risk averse during their childbearing years. See,
e.g., EDWARD WILSON, SOCIOBIOLOGY 158-62 (1980); EDWARD WILSON, ON HUMAN NATURE
86-87, 124 (1978); Jack Hirshleifer, Evolutionary Models in Economics and Law, 4 RES. IN

L. & ECON. 1. 39-40 & nn. 48-49 (1982) (explaining ways of resolving rivalry among men
for the attention of women).
62. Margaret F. Brinig & Douglas W. Allen, Sex, Property Rights, and Divorce (May
1995) (on file with author).
63. The original number of convictions was 5582. Observations were omitted for
drivers from outside the Washington, D.C. area (for whom wealth data could not be
collected) and for those convicted of reckless driving. This resulted in 4374 usable
observations.
64. The code violation involved the number of miles over the speed limit at a given
speed.
65. See note 56.
66. Speeds 5-10 m.p.h. were normalized to zero. Again, Males were represented as
sex=1, Females as sex=0.
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Table IV. Logit Analysis of Speeding Tickets by Age, Sex and Income
Speed

Variable

Coefficient

Std. Error

T-radio

Prob 1ll >X

Mean of X

SL DeV. of X

0-15

AGE

.0051641

.0034879

14.806

0.0000

32.999

11.436

SEX

-. 0135651

.0103679

-1.308

-. 19075

.63306

.53209

INCOME

.94E-08

.474E-07

.199

.84212

.23E+06

.10E+06

AGE

.014784

.0004564

22.957

.0000

32.999

11.436

SEX

.098035

.0135680

6.692

0.0000

.63306

.53209

INCOME

.853E-06

.620E-07

13.753

.0000

.23E+06

.10E+06

AGE

.0007516

.0002723

2.76

0.00578

32.999

11.436

SEX

.0088315

.0080954

1.091

.27531

.66306

.53209

INCOME

.261E-06

.370E-07

7.045

.0000

.23E+06

.10E+06

AGE

-.000432

.0001956

-2.206

.02739

32.999

11.436

SEX

.0423266

.0058149

7.279

.0000

.63306

.53209

INCOME

.135E-06

.266E-07

5.087

0.000

2.3E+06

.10E+06

AGE

-. 000164

.0001446

-1.135

.25642

32.999

11.436

SEX

.0149346

.0004299

3A74

.00051

.63306

.53209

INCOME

.828E-07

.196E-07

4.215

.00002

.23E+06

.10E+06

AGE

.864E-05

.548E-04

.168

.86661

32.999

11A36

SEX

-.005027

.0015293

-3.287

.00101

.63306

.53209

INCOME

.233E-07

.699E-08

3.335

.00085

.23E+06

.10E+06

AGE

.19E-05

.138E-04

.138

.89037

32.999

11.436

SEX

-.000293

.0004099

-.715

.4475

.63306

.53209

INCOME

.10E-08

.18E-08

.575

.56558

.23E+06

.10E+06

20-25

25-30

30-35

35-40

40-45.

over 45
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Assuming, in the absence of specific data in either direction,
that women are convicted of speeding in the same proportions as
men, and also that approximately the same amount of speeding
behavior exists for each case resulting in a conviction,6 7 this study
shows that for the most part, men tend to speed more excessively
than women do. Of the seven levels, men were convicted of speeding significantly more often than women in three of the levels.
Women's convictions exceeded men's significantly in only one instance.68 Since we have attempted to hold age and wealth constant,
it appears that men are unwilling to risk being caught and convicted
of speeding almost as much as women.
C. Other Ramifications of Differential Risk Aversion
Standardized tests provide both a test of the risk taking behavior
explored already and an example of how differences in attitudes
about risk explain everyday phenomena. If girls are more risk
averse than boys, they will score lower than boys on standardized

67. It could be that men tend to be arrested on a more frequent basis than are
women, cf. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 200-01 (1976) (citing statistics which showed male
arrests for driving under the influence and drunkenness substantially outnumbered female
arrests), but there is no data to show this. Data for Nov. 1, 1990 - Oct. 31, 1991, from
Michele Nunneville, Arlington County Clerk's Office also shows males are arrested more
frequently, with the results being more apparent as the degree of speeding increases.
Data from Arlington County, Virginia, shows the same results for citations based upon
radar as for arrests after observation. These results are illustrated in Table V:
Table V. Convictions for Speeding, Radar and Non-Radar
Type of conviction

Females

Males

Non-radar, 1-9 m.p.h. over limit

10

28

Non-radar, 10-14 m.p.h. over

142

320

Non-radar, 15-19 m.p.h. over

198

516

Non-radar, over 20 m.p.h. over

63

237

Radar, 1-9 m.p.h. over limit

17

22

Radar, 10-14 m.p.h. over limit

3179

3929

Radar, 15-19 m.p.h. over limit

2606

3942

Radar, over 20 m.p.h. over

471

982

68. This was at 4045 m.p.h. over the speed limit. At that speed and higher,- one
possible explanation for women's conviction rates being higher is that men were being
convicted for other offenses such as reckless driving, which are quasi criminal. Men had
161 tickets for "reckless" offenses as opposed to simple speeding; women had 80. Additionally, the results may be unreliable given that the number of observations at these
speeds was very small, only 13 out of 4374 total convictions.
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tests. 9 This will occur because girls can be expected to answer
fewer items than their male counterparts. Given a situation in
which they are uncertain of which of two or three choices is
correct, boys will be more apt to guess while girls will leave the
question unanswered7 0 Girls should therefore have: (1) scores on
the standardized portions of tests that are lower than on the
written portions, (2) more questions omitted than boys,71 and (3)
lower total scores than boys. In fact, all three of these phenomena
occur, as demonstrated in the various studies discussed below.

Gansk and Associates perform regular analyses of the California
Bar Examination. The exam is composed of two parts, the Multistate Bar Examination (MBE), a 200-item multiple choice test, and
a Written Examination, composed of six essay questions and two
Performance Test (PT) problems. The weighted results for the July
1990 examination 72 show that females score significantly lower than
their male counterparts on the standardized portion of the examination, but outscore men on the written examination. Because of

the way the scores are weighted, with greater weight given to the
written examination, women outperform men in total scores. 73
Meta-analysis revealed that 51/o of males outperformed females
on various mathematics tests.74 Although there was a slight female

69. The fact that traditional predictors underpredict girls' college grade point averages
has been established in numerous studies. A fairly recent article, Robert McCormack &

Mary McLeod, Gender Bias in the Prediction of College Course Performance, 25 J. EDUC.
MEASUREMENT 321 (1988) finds that if adjustments are made for gender differences,
averages are predicted more reliably than individual course grades. Id. McCormack and
McLeod's study contains citations and discussions of much of the relevant literature.
70. 1 have no scientific method to address the question of content bias, but simply
note that some of the differences in test results are apparently explained by differential

risk aversion.
71. Here, questions omitted refer to questions scattered throughout the exam that
are left unanswered. If girls omitted only questions at the end of the examination, what
we might be observing is a greater degree of care taken by the girls or a lack of
budgeting of examination time.
72. STEPHEN P. KLEIN & ROGER BoLus, ANALYSIS OF THE JULY 1990 EXAM (1990). In

California, the total scale score was computed by the following formula:Total Scale Score
=

(.35)(MBE Scale) + (.65)(Essay Scale).
73. Dr. Klein assured me that "this pattern is very typical of what we find." Letter

from Dr. Stephen Klein, to Margaret Brinig, Professor of Law, George Mason University
(May 1992) (on file with author).

74. Janet S. Hyde et al., Gender Differences in Mathematics Performance: A Meta-

Analysis 107(2) PSYCH. BULL. 139-55 (1990). Meta-analysis is a technique that aggregates
the findings of numerous smaller studies, regardless of the number of variables in each
or of differences in other test conditions. The SAT was eliminated from most of the
testing because "the enormity of sample size" overwhelmed other results. The authors
reported a considerably larger gender difference for the SAT than they found in their

overall meta-analysis. The 1985 scores analyzed show a male mean of 499 and a female
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superiority in performance in the elementary and middle school
years, a moderate male superiority emerged in the high school
years (= 0.29) and continued in the college years (= 0.41), as well
as in adulthood (=0.59). This result is important for mediation,
which focuses on post-secondary school risk-taking, and confirms
the results of my experiment.
There should be a more significant difference in test scores on
the SAT, where the directions specify that the correct answers
are counted, but a fraction of a point is subtracted for each incorrect
answer. 6 The difference emerges because girls who are unsure of
an answer will be less inclined to guess than their male counterparts. The differences are significant, 7 even though the same
students perform as well as males in college-level mathematics
courses.78
Although the College Board performs many studies on the SAT,
two are of interest for this paper. One involves "Sex Differences
in the Performance of High-Scoring Examinees on the SAT-M
(Math)."79 Here the tests of those scoring at or above 650 on the
SAT-M in May 1987 or November 1987, and at or above 660 in
May 1988, were analyzed.P
The study found that:
Contrary to previous reports, there was no indication that item
content or format influenced differential performance. The pri-

mean of 452. Id. at 150. The authors explained the difference by noting that gender
differences are more pronounced as the sample becomes more selective, and because
"there may be features of the content of the test itself or of its administration that
enlarge the difference between males and females." Id.
75. Id. at 149.
76. The fraction deducted for wrong answers is one-fourth, according to THE COLLEGE
BOARD, ATP GUIDE 1991-92 FOR HIGH SCHOOLS AND COLLEGES 18 (1991). The same tendency

should be found on the PSAT, taken by juniors to determine eligibility for National Merit
Scholarships. This test also has wider ramifications, as students who are National Merit
semi-finalists gain an advantage over their peers who have similar grade point averages.
More subtly, the number of National Merit finalists produced by schools is considered
by parents in deciding where to move, or which high school to select for their children.
77. An American Association of University Women report states that there is about
a 50 point difference. AM. Assoc. OF UNIV. WOMEN, supra note 53, at 54. The difference
on the 1985 test was 47 points.
78. M.J. Clark & J. Grandy, Sex Differences in the Academic Performance of Scholastic
Aptitude Test Takers, College Board Report No. 84-8 (New York: College Entrance
Examination Board 1984).
79. Id.
80. This resulted in 18,683 males and 7577 females for May, 1987; 24,984 males and
12,157 females for November, 1987; and 19,145 males and 7560 females for May, 1988. Id.
at 2-3. Obviously, males outnumber the females in each test by at least a ratio of 2 to 1.
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mary content of four of the five items on which females outperformed males was geometry (which has previously been shown

to favor males). Items favoring males were evenly distributed
across algebra and geometry. Finally, only 3 of the 18 flagged

items were word problems (a format variable previously found
to favor males).8'

Further, "the percentage of females omitting or not reaching
any item is consistently greater than the percentage of males
omitting or not reaching that same item. Across all three forms,
there are no items where males omitted at a greater rate than
females."12 The author of the study, with no supporting evidence,
attributed this difference to "females' lower confidence in their
mathematical ability. Females may omit these items more frequently than males because they cannot solve them in the allotted
time using a standard algorithm and they do not have enough
confidence in their mathematical 'intuition' to make an educated
guess."8

One study by the College Board, "Differential Speededness and
Item Omit Patterns on the SAT," reveals that females omit items
more frequently than males and the difference in omissions showed
up most frequently in less difficult questions.14 This study examined
the SAT in 1984 and 1985. However, there appeared to be little
consistent evidence that women performed less speedily than men.8
Finally, in Shamif by Salahuddin v. New York State Education
Department, girls successfully sought an injunction against the
use of the SAT in awarding Regents scholarships. Although the
girls did at least as well as boys in college, the standardized tests
overwhelmingly identified males as scholarship winners. Use of the
test was found to violate the equal protection clause. Yet as our
results show, much of the difference may be the result of relative
risk aversion, rather than discrimination.
Like standardized test results, the choice of whether to purchase
insurance illustrates how differences in attitudes about risk explain
everyday phenomenon. My research and the literature on risk

81. Id- at 4.

82. Id. at 7.
83. Id. at 9.
84. ALICIA SCHMITT

ET AL., EDuc. TESTING SERVICE, DIFFERENTIAL SPEEDEDNESS AND

ITEM OMIT PATTERNS ON THE SAT, RES. REP. 91-50, at 15 (1991).

85. Id. at 18.
86. 709 F. Supp. 345 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
87. Id. at 364.
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aversion would predict that, ceteris paribus, women would purchase
more insurance than men. However, empirical confirmation is sparse.
I have not found a source that presents data in a form that permits
meaningful analysis. In addition, because life insurance does not
benefit the insured, except in a "peace of mind" sense, but benefits
her survivors,88 it is difficult to separate the policy holder's and
the beneficiaries' concern for risk. Moreover, insurance data do not
allow the researcher to separate insurance purchases from insurance provided by employers. Nonetheless, what we have been able
to locate is not inconsistent with our predictions.
The Buyer Study: A Market Study of New Insureds and the
9 contains information grouped
OrdinaryLife Insurance Purchased1
by gender, income, age, and marital status. The tabulated information is presented separately for each of these groupings. What
would be most useful for purposes of testing the hypothesis proffered in this paper would be an analysis using all these variables.
For example, we know that men and women can be compared in
the aggregate by income level. The results follow:
Table VI. Insurance Policies by Sex
Income of Employed

Average Size Policy:

Average Size Policy:

Insured

Men

Women

$100,000 and over

$360,870

$225,880

$75,000 -99,000

$231,560

$264,250

50,000-74,999

$180,140

$137,820

40,000-49,999

$117,880

$112,860

30,000-39,999

$97,620

$84,830

20,000-29,999

$81,620

$69,200

10,000-19,999.

$64,110

$53,360

under 10,000

$59,950

$47,450

Average

$138,570

$78,380

88. As an old Burma Shave sign read, "Although insured, remember kiddo, the one
they pay will be your widow."
89. LIFE INS. MARKETING AND RES. ASS'N, INC., THE BUYER STUDY, UNITED STATES: A
MARKET STUDY OF NEw INSUREDS AND THE ORDINARY LIFE INSURANCE PURCHASED (1991)
(association located in Hartford, Conn.).
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The evidence above suggests that women are less risk averse
when it comes to the purchase of life insurance because at nearly
all income levels women purchased less insurance than men.
However, this is not necessarily true. Only 4/0 of the women
compared to 8% of the men were self-employed. Fifteen percent
of the women, while 26% of the men, were manager-administrators. Two percent of the women, and 5% of the men were
business owners. Men in these three categories purchased 43%
of the policies, while women in these three catagories purchased
only 23%. These business owners would be those most likely to
require "key employee" insurance because of their importance to
the business. In addition, there is no indication how many of the
women studied represented second wage earners within their
families. There was no category for "married-only source of
income" or "single" subdivided by income and gender. Finally,
we do not know the age of each person purchasing a policy. We
do know that younger women seem to be purchasing insurance
at a higher rate than men; 50% of the women in the study were
less than 40 years old, while only 46% of the men were. This
difference exists despite the fact that it is women who have a
longer life expectancy, and therefore is consistent with my finding
that women are actually more risk averse.
C. Risk-Taking and Entrepreneurship
Frank Knight, in his classic Risk, Uncertainty and Profit,90
discusses the difference between risk and uncertainty. Risk is
something that can be insured against-although several things
might happen, the options are known and the probabilities within
which each are likely to occur are also known. With uncertainty,
however, there might be unknown options and the probability of
occurrence or distribution function is unknown. 9' Knight justifies
the capitalist's retaining a firm's earnings on the ground that
only the entrepreneur is dealing with uncertainty; other employees of the corporation have fixed claims and will get paid regardless of whether the firm is successful. The bank or other
lending institution can compensate for the variance in a business'
likely success by charging higher interest rates. The entrepreneur in this sense is not risk averse.92

90. FRANK H. KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY AND PROFIT (1985).

91. Friedman & Savage, supra note 25, at 289.
92. See ISRAEL KIRZNER, DISCOVERY AND THE CAPITALIST PROCESS (1985) (providing
insights into the role of uncertainty and entrepreneurship).
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If the analysis is correct, one probable outcome is that women
are less likely than similarly situated men to become entrepreneurs rather than employees. 93 Women graduating from Harvard
Business School are more likely than their male classmates to
seek employment rather than to become entrepreneurs. 94
The Title VII case EEOC v. Sears95 was viewed by some
feminists as a defeat because it requires plaintiffs to show that
they were interested in commissioned sales work as well as show
that females were underrepresented in these jobs.98 While I
certainly would not advocate unlawful discrimination on the part
of Sears or any other employer, 97 it is interesting to note that
the apparent "lack of interest" in commissioned sales jobs demonstrated by Sears is consistent with women generally being
more risk averse than men. 98 Salaried sales positions offer a
certain stream of income whereas commissioned sales do not.
Even though salaried sales personnel earn less on average than
commissioned workers, 99 it is predictable that the risk averse
applicant might well choose the "sure thing." 100

93. This is also consistent with the real business cycle literature on "employment
lotteries." See P.T. Geary & J. Kennan, Tw Employment-Real Wage Relationship: An
InternationalStudy, 90 J. POL. ECON. 854 (1982).
94. See, e.g., Martha Terdick, Women Like Us, 51 Bus. Q. 60 (1986) (careers of Harvard
women MBAs class of 1975); Laura Zinn, A Bias in B-school-and in Business, BUSINESS
WEEK, June 18, 1990, at 166-67. Once self-employed, the select group of women owning
small businesses apparently has the same risk-taking propensity as do male entrepreneurs.
Robert Masters & Robert Meier, Sex Differences and Risk-Taking Propensityof Entrepreneurs, 26 J. OF SMALL Bus. MGMT. 31-33 (1988); see also Michael Wallach & Albert Caron,
Attribute Criterialityand Sex-Linked Conservatism as Determinants of Psychological Similarity, 58 J. OF ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCH. 43-50 (1959).
95. 628 F. Supp. 1264 (N.D. Ill. 1986).
96. Joan Williams, Deconstructing Gender, 87 Mich. L. Rev., 777, 819 & n.87 (arguing
that by not requiring Sears to provide equivalent proof of the specific percentage of
women who fit gender stereotypes, the opinion established a legal presumption that all
women fit traditional stereotypes).
97. Indeed, I agree with Williams that as a matter of strict statutory construction,
Title VII requires accommodation of specific women who do not fit gender stereotypes.
See International Union v. Johnson Controls, 886 F.2d 871, 920 (1988) (Easterbrook, J.
dissenting) ("Title VII requires employers to evaluate applicants and employees as
individuals rather than as members of a group defined by sex.").
98. Differential risk aversion would probably not have made much of a difference
under the facts of Sears, 628 F. Supp. 1264, where the reason for the difference in the
desire for commissioned sales position was not central to the outcome.
99. Between 1973 and 1980 the median hourly wages for first-year commission sales
workers were about twice as high as those for all noncommission sales workers. Plaintiffs
Pretrial Brief-Commission Sales Issues at 27, EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 628 F.
Supp. 1264 (N.D. Ill. 1986).
100. Of course, it is entirely possible that more than one set of factors is operating
here, for example, that women are both risk averse and more inclined to choose family
values.
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The fact that women are more risk averse than men also
supports Carol Rose's theory about why women accumulate less
property. 0 1 Rose postulates that women accumulate less because
they are less interested in speculating as to increases and decreases in value than men similarly situated. Recently, two female
economists at Colorado State University, Nancy Jiankoplos and
Alexandra Bernasek, have looked at insurance and security purchase behavior primarily as reported on surveys, and have found
mixed indications of risk aversion. 02 Women said they were risk
averse more often than did men, but did not own fewer risky
assets nor more insurance.
If these quite consistent findings from more neutral areas
translate into the mediation context, women in fact could be
systematically disadvantaged when given a mediation alternative.
D. Risk-Taking and Law Study
In November 1993, the front pages of national newspapers
contained a story about gender discrimination at the University
of Pennsylvania Law School. 03 The news story was based on law
professor Lani Guinier's work with several coauthors who surveyed past and present Pennsylvania law. students about their
classroom experiences. 10 4 In addition, the article featured empirical work on the grading at that Ivy League school.01 5 Despite
slightly better entering credentials, women earned substantially
lower grades, particularly in the large first year classes upon
which law review membership hinges, 10 6 affecting federal clerkships and large firm hiring in turn.
Many of us in law teaching examined our own experiences and
consciences after reading this provocative piece. A number of
teachers I have talked to from schools around the country report
that they have noticed similar, if not identical, phenomena. Women
do not tend to participate as often nor as actively as men,

101. Carol M. Rose, Women and Property: Gaining and Losing Ground, 78 VA. L. REv.
421 (1991).

102. Nancy Ammon Jianakoplos & Alexandra Bernasek, Are Women More Risk Averse?
(Western Economic Association, June 30, 1994).
103. See Ruth Rich, Many Female Law Students Here Cite 'Overt Bias,' Survey Reveals
Sexist Remarks and Hostility, Chi. Sun Times, Feb. 15, 1995.
104. Lani Guinier et al., Women's Ezperiences at One Ivy League School, 143 U. PA. L.
REV. 1 (1994).
105. Id. at 21-26.
106. Id at 27-28.
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particularly in large first year courses, and particularly in those
taught by men. Nor are women's grades as good.
The women at my law school, who have talked to me in fairly
substantial numbers, report things very similar to Guinier's: a
feeling of being intimidated and somehow degraded in their first
year classes. They suggest an "outside-ness:" an exclusion not
just by off-color jokes or sports references but by insensitivity
to differences in thought patterns. They found that they underperformed in classes for which classroom participation was graded,
while doing much better than their male classmates in seminars
or other courses requiring substantial written work.
How does this difference in performance relate to risk aversion? If women, more than men, are uncomfortable with uncertainty because they are inherently more risk averse, they will
be less inclined to volunteer unless they are certain of answers.
Hearing a variety of answers from colleagues, none of which are
pronounced "right," will be more unsettling to the risk averse
than to those who are risk neutral. In other words, the Socratic
method itself, especially as practiced in large classrooms and with
male instructors, may make it hard for at least some women to
learn.
II.

A.

THE WOMAN AS ALTRUIST

Altruistic behavior and its consequences for divorce

Altruism in its simplest form is care for another. The altruist
and the other, as defined by the economist, have interdependent
utility functions,'1° so that the altruist is willing to reduce her
own consumption to increase the consumption of others. 0 8 The
altruist takes the other's utility or happiness into account, so
that the other's utility is an extension of the altruist's own.109
Sometimes this provides the.altruist with a kind of pleasure; at
other times, the altruist acts out of a sense of duty."0 "[Hielping
or giving out of love is instrumental behavior, that is, concerned
with outcomes. If I help my child, I seek the best means to make

107. See Gary Becker, Altruism, Egoism and Genetic Fitness: Economics and Sociobiology, J. EcoN. LITERATURE 817, 818 (1976).
108. See EDWARD WILSON, SOCIORIOLOOY 59-62 (1980).

109. John J. Seater, Ricardian Equivalence, 31 J. ECON. LITERATURE 142, 147 (1993).
110. Jon Elster, Selfishness and Altruism, in BEYOND SELF-INTEREST 44-45 (Jane Mansbridge ed., 1990).
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that child happy .... The concept of duty is more ambiguous: it
can be instrumental or squarely noninstrumental."'111 Milton Regan, in his recent book, writes that the altruist perceives the
112
self as part of a common humanity, as a relational self.
Carol Gilligan, perhaps the best known relational feminist,
reports that women consistently tend to describe themselves in
terms of the relationships in which they are or have been involved. 113 Women operate with an "ethic of care,'

44

looking at

each course of action in terms of its potential to strengthen or
fracture current relationships. 5 Women might seem to be altruistic when they actually are being victimized.11
As Wanda Weigers writes,
I am not suggesting that men as individuals are incapable of
altruism or have never been altruistic, nor that women's happiness is not intimately connected to the happiness of others.
However, men have never been expected to adhere to a morality of self-sacrifice simply on account of their gender. For
some women, by contrast, self-sacrifice or self-denial remains
a 'way of life' and a 'consistent duty."'1

Work outside the home is therefore viewed by women, but not
men, as a choice between work and family." 8 Women's personalities are characterized by sharing," 9 communitarianism, 20 and

111. Id. at 46. As economist Alfred Marshall wrote many years ago, "Men labor and
save chiefly for the sake of their families and not for themselves." ALFRED MARSHALL,
PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 228 (1920).

112. REGAN, supra note 15; at 114; see also Christopher Jencks, Varieties of Altruism,
in BEYOND SELF-INTEREST, supra note 111, at 53, 54.
113. CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN'S

DEVELOPMENT 159 (1982); see also Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1 (1988); Grillo, supra note 17, at 1601.
114. GILLIGAN, supra note 114, at 30, 156-60.

115. Wanda Weigers, Economic Analysis of Law and "Piivate Ordering'" A Feminisf
Critique, 42 U. TORONTO L.J. 170, 193 (1992).
116. Id.

117. Id. at 37; Judith Farr Tormey, Ezploitation, Oppression and Self.Sacrifice, in
Women and Philosophy: Toward a Theory of Liberation 219-20 (Carol Dould and Mark
Wartofsky eds., 1976).
118. KATHLEEN GERSON, HARD CHOICES 163 (1985); see also Joan Williams, Gender Wars:
Selfless Women in the Republic of Choice, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1559 (1991); MARTHA FINEMAN.
THE ILLUSION OF EQUALITY (1991).
119. Robin West, Taking Preferences Seriously, 64 TUL. L. REV. 659, 666-67 (1990); Robin
West, Jurisprudence and Gender, supra note 114, at 13-28.

120. Jeanne Schroeder. Abduction from the Seraglio: Feminist Methodologies and the
Logic of Imagination, 70 TEx. L. REV. 109, 130 (1991).
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caring. 21 If wives are significantly more altruistic, they would be
disadvantaged when they bargain with their husbands because
they would be self-compelled to maintain some marital connec22
tions even after separation and'even to their own detriment.
Some altruism in a divorcing couple is a good thing. To the
degree that a continuing relationship is needed following divorce,
values of trust and empathy are probably necessary ingredients."23 Sometimes former spouses must make sacrifices that
assist the family.

24

The problem is that if the wife is willing to

make concessions to benefit the divorcing family, while the hus1 25
band is not, bargaining becomes inherently unfair.
B. Some Tests of Altruism
Using the experiments of Robin Dawes and others 126 as a model,
I devised a simple test to determine whether women are more

121. NEL NODDINGS, CARING: A FE5MININE APPROACH TO ETHICS AND MORAL EDUCATION
(1984); Joan Tronto, Beyond Gender Difference: To a Theory of Care, 12 SIGNS: JOURNAL
OF WOMEN IN CULTURE AND SOCIETY 644 (1987).

122. Grillo, supra, note 17, at 1550; see also NANCY CHODOROW, THE REPRODUCTION OF
MOTHERING, 176-80 (1978); Gilligan, supra note 114, at 64-105. Rosenberg, supra note 17,
at 493, argues that the parent who is "stronger" would be likely to do better in nonmediated settlements, and, indeed, during the entire marriage. After divorce, there will
be competition among men for the most desirable women. Although single women may
be preferred, some divorced men marry divorced women. Presumably altruism is a
desirable characteristic in a future mate, especially when one has experienced divorce.
Id.
123. Jencks, supra note 113, at 61-62 (suggesting that reciprocal altruism, in which one
person helps another and is helped in turn, depends upon trust, which in turn depends
to some extent on empathy); see also ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION
(1984); R.L. Trivers, The Evolution of ReciprQcalAltruism, 46 Q. REV. Bio. 35 (1971). Some
sort of tit-for-tat strategy is probably effective in the child support and visitation context.
See ANATOL RAPOPORT & A.M. CHANMAH, PRISONER'S DILEMMA (1965) (cooperation on the
part of one individual enhances the probability that others will cooperate later in that
same situation or a similar one). Similarly, as the proportion of the population that is
honest grows, it becomes more probable that a given individual is trustworthy, therefore
the expected value of interacting with him or her rises. Frank, supra note 22, at 597.
124. Robyn M. Dawes et al., Cooperationfor the Benefit of Us-Not Me, or My Conscience,
in BEYOND SELF INTEREST, supra note 111, at 97.
125. See Trivers, supra note 124, at 36 (referring to the failure to reciprocate as
threatening behavior).
126. Dawes et. al., supra note 125, at 101.03. This study found that if people in the
group were allowed to discuss their future choices, they might make "deals" for splitting
the prizes once the entire group "won" the larger prize. The element of risk, and thus
altruism, was diminished by the discussion. The subjects in our experiment were not
allowed to discuss their plans. There might be some difference in results based uporr
gender-different preferences for chocolate. I have no data to suggest this. For people
who chose a small non-chocolate prize, the results were consistent with the chocolate
prize group.
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willing to give than are men. A sample of 255 people ranging in
age from five to 66 years was divided into groups of five. All
members of each group were about the same age, with no member
more than two years older or younger than any other in the
group. Each participant indicated age, sex, and zip code. 127 The
participants were given five Hershey's Kisses® each. They were told
that if three people in their group would contribute their
five Hershey's Kisses,® everyone in the group would receive ten
more. Thus, if three contributed, they would receive ten Hershey's Kisses,® and the others woul& receive fifteen. If less than
a majority contributed, those who had contributed would lose
their five Hershey's Kisses® while the others in the group kept
their original five. Those choosing to contribute were the altruists, since they could in no event do as well as those who kept
their own Hershey's Kisses.® However, their contribution increased the probability of a larger reward for the other members
of the group. The results of a probit regression 28 using the choice
of contributing as the dependent variable are shown in Table
VII:
Table VII. Preferences for Altruism on Behalf of a Group.
Variable

Coefficient

Standard Error

T-ratio

Problt\6x

Mean of X

Std. of X

AGE

.293138E-01

.502634E-02

5.832

0.0000

18.941

11.195

SEX

-.14587

.152909

-.954

.34018

.45098

.49857

What the table demonstrates is that age is significantly related
to altruism: as the experimental subject's age increased, so did
the probability of choosing to contribute to the group. However,
gender did not predict altruism in this pure sense, although the
negative sign indicates that women were slightly more willing
to contribute, controlling for age.

127. See supra note 56.
128. The regression was performed using the statistical package LIMDEP. Probit
analysis was chosen since the dependent variable was a dummy having the value of 1
for contribution or 0 for no contribution. The Chi-Squared for the equation was 21.058,

showing that the results in all probability did not happen by chance.
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People who give money to charities are also altruistic. 129 Although I did not have access to raw data and could not run
regressions, I was able to obtain national statistics on charitable
30
giving broken down by marital status, sex and income level.1 I
was particularly interested in contributions by single women as
compared to those of single men. 131 Women heads-of-household
give a total of 1.6% of their income to charities, while men headsof-household give 1.8%.132 The income levels of people in this
study were $38,688 for men and $35,075 for women. The popular
press indicates that women give at least as frequently as men.
However, the size of gifts given at every income level is higher
for men than women. 33
A more recent test of altruism demonstrated that in a number
of prisoner's dilemma experiments performed by undergraduate
economics students, "where subjects may choose to split a larger
pie with a 'bad' partner, or a smaller pie with a 'good' partner,"134
women were less likely to make decisions on principle, but were
more responsive to changes in the parameters of the decision
making environment."31 In playing ultimatum games, "in which
two players split a fixed amount of many according to specific
bargaining rules,"' 36 there were no real gender differences in the
proposals made. However, as respondents, men expected more
generous offers to be made to them, while women7 did not seem
to expect more generous proposals from others."3
These two attempts to empirically verify differences in altruism are not exhaustive, but suggest avenues for future research.

129. They may not be "purely" altruistic though, see James Andreoni, Giving with
Impure Altruism: Applications to Charity and Ricardian Equivalence, 97 J. POL. ECON.
1447 (1989).
130. INDEPENDENT SECTOR, GIVING AND VOLUNTEERING IN THE UNITED STATES (1992).
131. Charitable giving by single people eliminates the possibility that they give at
least in part from a spouse's income rather than their own.
132. INDEPENDENT SECTOR, supra note 131, at 54, 69 Tables 1.18, 2.1.
133. Why Can't a Woman Give Like a Man? WORKING WOMAN 70 (Nov. 1992).
134. Catherine C. Eckel & Philip Grossman, The Relative Price of Fairness: Gender
Differences in a Punishment Game (Department of Economics, University of Arizona,
Working Paper, 1994).
135. Id.
136. Catherine C. Eckel & Phillip Grossman, Chivalry and Solidarity in Ultimatum
Games (Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, Working Paper, 1994). The
ultimatum game is one in which students divide money. The first is given a sum of
money, say $1.00, which she can divide between herself and the other player in any way
she desires. The other player can choose whether to accept the proffered amount or
reject it, in which case neither gets any.
137. Id.
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Two problems in particular ought to be addressed. The first is
that giving to complete strangers, while closer to altruism in its
pure sense, may have very little relationship to caring behavior
within the family. Within the family, even during a dissolving
marriage, one is concerned with outcomes.
The second problem is that I have not independently examined
giving in terms of time. If a study controlled for opportunity cost
(income) was conducted, one could examine volunteer activities
by women relative to men. Such a study would still have a
drawback because it involves giving to strangers," The Independent Sector study discussed above found that 53/o of the
women responding to the survey reported volunteer activity
during the previous twelve months, averaging 2.6 hours per week.
At the same time, 49/0 of the men had volunteered, for an
average of 1.6 hours per week. 139
When one focuses on altruism within the family, a gender
difference does emerge. Several studies focus directly on the
amount of time spent on child care, while holding income constant.
Work may influence the total amount of time parents spend with
children, but impact more in those aspects of the family life in
which children are relatively peripheral, such as homemaking or
entertaining than in specifically child-oriented activities. 1 0 However, despite gender equality and involvement within the work
force, it is still primarily women who raise children. One study
showed a disparity of at least two to one between women's and
men's participation in all child care."'

138. People indicated that they volunteered because it was important to help others
(90% of respondents), they felt compassion toward people in need (86%), they could do

something for a cause important to them (86%), and because it made them feel needed
(79%). INDEPENDENT SECTOR, supra, note 131, at 211, 224, Table 6.2.

139. INDEPENDENT SECTOR, supra note 131, at 59, Table 1.20. Many more married
couples (56%) than single people (48%) volunteered their time, and both these groups
volunteered more than divorced, separated or widowed people (36%). Single women
contributed .9% of their income and volunteered 2.3 hours per week; divorced women

1.4% and 1.4 hours. For single men, the totals were 1.00 and 1.4 hours per week; when
divorced they gave 1.6% and 1.1 hours per week.
140. Steven I. Nock & Paul W. Kingston, Time with Children: The Impact of Couples'
Work-Time Commitments, 67(1) SOCIAL FORCES 59, 71 (1988).

141. Cynthia Rexroot & Constance Sheehan, Family Life Cycle and Spouses' Time in
Housework, 49 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 737, 744 & Table 3 (1987). The division of labor is
equally dramatic for household tasks. See VICTOR FUCHS, WOMEN'S QUEST FOR ECONOMIC
EQUALITY 78, 103 (1988); Nancy Dowd, Work and Family: The Gender Paradox and the

Limitations of DiscriminationAnalysis in Restructuring the Workplace, 24 HARV. C.R.C.L. L. REV. 19, 85 & n.14 (1989); Rebecca Stafford et al., The Division of Labor Among
Cohabiting and Married Couples, 39 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 43 (1977); Gene Vanek, Time
Spent in Housework, 231 SC. AM. 116, 118 (1974).
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MEDIATION

On the whole, women may be more altruistic than men, at
least in the context of relationships. When they are bargaining
over the future of their families, this difference in attitudes about
relationships might well affect the bargaining result.
III.

CONCLUSION

From an empirical standpoint, it is unclear whether gender
differences impede women's ability to mediate successfully. Women
are apparently not more risk averse. They do not trade money
for more custodial time because of risk aversion, but just appear
to want to be with their children more than their husbands do.
Since mothers get more child support as visitation time with
fathers increases, fathers are willing to "pay" for time with their
children up to a point.
Feminists who claim that women are more altruistic than men
also will have difficulty supporting their conclusions according to
the data. Women do not give more in terms of percentages or
money than men. Women seem to do more volunteer work and
a larger share of housework and child care than their husbands.
This difference in utilization of "leisure time," or more accurately,
non-labor market activity, may not be due to unselfish and caring
behavior. Greater time spent with children may occur because
women derive more utility from them than their husbands do,
other things being equal. Because of the husbands' greater earning potential, it is more efficient for women, with their lower
opportunity costs, to work less or more flexible hours. This
accommodates not only child care, with its positive value, but
also housework, which most women do not actually enjoy.
The difference in earning power and consequently power within
142
the relationship appears to be the real culprit in this story.
Men have an easier exit from marriage because their investments
are readily transferable. Therefore they can behave opportunistically during the marriage and can have less to lose during
mediation at dissolution. Women's threats are not as credible, so
they may have to settle for less. They also have a higher marginal

142. See also Rifkin, supra note 10. Since mediation emphasizes the process of resolving
the dispute, rather than formal and substantive rights, id at 25, to some extent power
differentials are besides the point. As she puts it, "patterns of domination are reinforced
by the lawyer-client relationship, in which the client is a passive recipient of the lawyer's
expertise." Id. at 30. However, since mediated divorces are not usually reviewed by
judges, there will be fewer "appeals" and less control of what may be arbitrary exercises
of power. See, e.g., Bryan, supra note 20, at 460.
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utility of income, since their income on average is lower than
their husbands'.
Because mediation is swifter, 1 3 less expensive, and easier on
children, it is a good alternative to litigation in many divorce
cases. Many women who have tried mediation liked it. However,
congested courts cannot justify mandatory mediation in cases
where one spouse holds a monopoly on marital power. No one
should order mediation when there has been abuse within the
family, substance abuse, or systematic hiding of assets.

143. Rosenberg, supra note 17, at 473 & n.25 (estimating average 3.2 hours); Pearson
& Thoennes, supra note 19.

